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Abstract: Chapman & Huffman (C & H) might be taken to argue as follows: Humans may treat
animals however they want only if humans are superior to animals. But humans are not superior
to animals. Therefore, humans may not treat animals however they want. Whatever its merit,
this is not C & H’s actual argument. Their point, instead, is that humans often mistreat animals
because they tend to perceive them as inferior. A remedy for animal mistreatment would then
be acknowledging the deep similarities between us and animals. But is C & H’s suggested remedy
likely to be effective to foster respect for animals?
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Humans possess a distinctive “norm-hungriness”, an idiosyncratic need or desire to create and
abide by a multitude of social norms (Colombo 2013, 2016). Courtesy of language and other
external structures that allow humans to objectify their thoughts, norm-hungriness promotes an
explosion of norms, leading to the creation of cognitive niches, such as legal systems, churches,
and schools, which ensure that certain norms are passed on to future generations, and get
updated or eliminated. Even if I’m right that norm-hungriness is uniquely human, nothing
follows about whether humans are superior to other animals.
In turn, whether humans are in some respect superior to other animals doesn’t entail
that humans are justified in treating animals any way we want. In How to Count Animals, More
or Less, for example, Kagan (in press) articulates a hierarchical approach to moral status, in
which humans have higher moral status than other animals (and different animals have higher
or lower moral status than others). On Kagan’s (forthcoming) hierarchical view, psychological
capacities necessary to have “deep relationships”, “more sophisticated and advanced
knowledge”, “more significant achievements” and an “ability to act out of moral conviction” (Ch.
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5.2) determine an agent’s moral status. Even if Kagan’s hierarchical view is right, nothing follows
about whether humans are justified to mistreat animals.
Many religious doctrines posit human superiority to animals; but they also recommend
that humans treat other animals with kindness and respect. For example, in the Catechism of
the Catholic Church, we read: “In God’s plan man and woman have the vocation of ‘subduing’
the earth as stewards of God. This sovereignty is not to be an arbitrary and destructive
domination. God calls man and woman, made in the image of the Creator ‘who loves everything
that exists’, to share in his providence toward other creatures; hence their responsibility for the
world God has entrusted to them”.
So, let’s get this straight: without further assumptions, the claim that humans are
somehow unique or superior to other animals doesn’t entail anything about how humans ought
to treat them.
In fact, Chapman & Huffman 2018 (C & H) make a different point. A point that will
remind some of their readers of de Montaigne’s passage is in An Apology for Raymond Sebond
(Book 2, Chapter 12, The Essays):
“Presumption — writes de Montaigne — is our natural and original disease. The most
wretched and frail of all creatures is man, and withal the proudest.... ’Tis by the same
vanity of imagination that he equals himself to God, attributes to himself divine qualities,
withdraws and separates himself from the crowd of other creatures, cuts out the shares
of the animals, his fellows and companions, and distributes to them portions of faculties
and force, as himself thinks fit”.
Similarly to de Montaigne, C & H point out that perceptions of human uniqueness have often
been used for defending claims of human superiority, which, in turn, have been used for
licencing cruelty to animals. “We need to acknowledge — C & H suggest — how much we
resemble them and how much we have to learn from them. Doing so will allow us to make
decisions ... with a realistic understanding of the consequences of our actions, for them as well
as for us”. So C & H’s point as well as their suggested remedy for animal mistreatment is focused
on human psychology — on the similarities between humans and other animals. But is there
reason to believe C & H’s suggested remedy is generally effective?
One of the most robust findings in social psychology is the association between
perceiving a group as having a dissimilar worldview and having negative attitudes towards
members of that group (Byrne 1969). While this association may prompt intolerant behaviour
towards outgroups, social psychologists have identified various ways to reduce prejudice — for
instance, by promoting interaction and contact between members of different groups, by
creating a common goal, and, indeed, by highlighting similarities between groups (e.g., Dovidio
& Gartner 1999; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).
Prejudice towards human outgroups seems to be related to prejudice towards other
animals (Plous 2003; Hodson & Costello 2012). Beliefs that animals and humans are similar have
been found to be associated with more positive attitudes to human outgroups, while “seeing
humans as different from and superior to animals plays a key role in animalistically
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dehumanizing human outgroups ... and negatively evaluating those outgroups” (Dhont et al.,
2014, 105).
So findings in social psychology give us reason to believe C & H’s suggested remedy is
likely to be effective. In some domains, however, it may be more effective to try and break the
link between dissimilarity and prejudice without altering perceived dissimilarities between
animals and humans. After all, fostering perceptions of similarity may be unfeasible and even
counterproductive in some domains — for example, in domains involving certain religious or
political beliefs, or eating practices to which many humans are committed and would not give
up without opposition.
Similarly, repeating that we have common goals like the conservation of the world’s
ecosystems, which may highlight similarities between humans’ and animals’ interests, may not
be the most effective option in the political domain, where humans with different political
values have fundamentally different views about how ecosystems should be preserved. Here
emphasising the similarities in the interests of humans and animals may motivate reactionary
responses.
Long-term, structural interventions aimed at breaking the association between
dissimilarity and prejudice, without altering perceived dissimilarities between animals and
humans, could be focused on cultivating personality traits like intellectual humility, or on
puncturing humans’ illusion of explanatory depth (Voelkel, Brandt, & Colombo 2018). If humans
realize — through education, trustworthy sources of information, respected role models, or
scientific contributions like C & H’s — that they know much less about other animals’ lives,
mental capacities, and behaviour than they initially assume, then they will question the basis for
their speciesism. Once we understand we know very little about other animals, we will learn to
treat them with respect and humility.
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